In my plan, I suggested chapter’s 3 and 4 would merge and become less pedestrian – i.e. subject followed by examples. Instead examples should flow throughout the essay. And that an alternative topic for 4 might present itself at some point. I’m wondering now if addressing the difference between revisionism and reviewing but coming to different conclusions with new information is worth investigating. This would entail looking at quantum erasure too where the past is changed by what happens in the future – as in chapter 7 Barad. (See final episode of Good Omens for example of this in popular culture/fantasy science fiction – relevant for BOW)
Category: Extended Written Project
CS A4: Notes – naive realism etc.
Veridical perception – what you see is what you get. (Hoffman, 2019 posits this can’t be the case)
Schrödinger – uses term ‘naive realism’ (Barad, 2007)
Daniel C Blight – talks about photography being conservative (agree!) (Twitter, 2019)
And photography does seem in many instances / general use to be tautological (CS A1 Field, 2019)- at which point it becomes reassuring/comforting to make and look at.
CS A3: Plan, sample text, schedule
Full document – inlcudes Sample, plan, schedule, bibliography and reflection:
CS A3 Entanglement Draft 5 – sample only .edited
Cut section (focuses on systems but think this muddies the water in an essay that needs to retain focus, despite the rhizome nature of the methodology – the cut section provides a background, so might need to insert some nuggets of information into the main body, however.)
CA A3: Plan and sample almost ready to share and submit
I have been really so ill the last week which has meant lots of plans cancelled. The good thing is I have been stuck indoors watching YouTube videos of Karen Barad and reading her book and making notes and writing and rewriting and preparing A3. I’ve sort of been at it the whole time (maybe that’s why it’s taking so long to get better).
Today I sent the sample to a physicist I have stumbled across who has kindly agreed to take a look at the theory and make sure I’m not making wildly inaccurate claims about quantum mechanics. I think it may be a strange thing for him to do though because Barad whose work my whole hypothesis bounces around is this peculiar hybrid of humanities and science which is unusual. But I am grateful to have the opportunity to have an actual scientist glance over my ideas – even though I suspect it might read to him like a 5-year-old’s version of the ideas he explores.
I asked him to look at the research question and pick holes in it – it is currently looking like this:
Diffraction
Entanglement
&
Photography
According to contemporary science-philosophies, the notion of isolated, unrelated objects in a void universe expresses an out-dated and unhelpful view of reality. Rather than seeing ‘things’ which have their own place in space and time, many academics have been exploring a universe which is emergent, and where everything is interconnected, relational, dynamic, non-linear and lively.
Within this evolving view of the universe, how – or can – photography successfully communicate the contemporary model described above? Or is it fatally challenged by its ontology?
I will upload his response (unless he tells me it’s all crap – in which case I’ll cry and start again) and the rest of the sample before long, hopefully.
Lastly, because of the Hollins paper I recorded here recently, I am tempted to rethink the very top heading. I will wait and see.
CS: A3 Research direction/question
I’ve been thinking … and beginning to reach an idea/draft research question
Entanglement
At a time in our history where a Cartesian [isolated, discrete unrelated objects in a void universe] view of life is increasingly being left behind, can still/straight photography ever be capable of expressing an entangled view of reality? Or does photography’s history and ontology condemn it forever to being a reinforcer of fixed (and many would argue – outdated) realities?
Peer responses here and in comments below blog:
But as a starting point, as a research question – this is great.
3. So it’s an exploration of the Cartesian model (which I would personally find very interesting) and then of straight photography and it’s relevance to, I assume, new models of realising reality (again really interesting)
BOW & CS Notes: Meeting the Universe Halfway, K.Barad, 2007 (Intro & Chpt. 1)
This book is vast and complex so I think I might try to make notes as I go. Although there is a risk in reading it that I will be carried away in unhelpful albeit exciting directions, I think it is worth taking because as I move through it I am beginning to have specific ideas about what I’m aiming to explore – and it’s very much linked to ‘seeing’. In DI&C A3 (2019) I began to explore the tendency for photography (both academic and more popular forms) to engage in hierarchical thinking, despite the fact that individuals within it often make great claims about using photography to interrogate society. This results in photography reinforcing rather than dismantling segregation of various forms.
Equipment and output are (perhaps catastrophically?) ‘entangled’ with the history and uses that engendered photography’s invention. I quoted Ariella Azoulay’s blog posts Unlearning the Origins of Photography (2018) which I now see are influenced by the same undoing of a Cartesian mindset that exists in Barad’s writing. I will also need to revisit Flusser’s Towards a Philosophy of Photography (2012) as the ‘apparatus’ – i.e. the social and economic machine in which the camera exists seems relevant.
So here are some bullet points notes for now:
- Begins with an analysis of Frayn’s play Copenhagen (first performance 1998) (rave reviews and repeated runs across the globe) which she says is beautifully written but flawed – then goes on to say why, effectively lumping it alongside a ‘plethora of popular accounts that have sacrificed rigor (sic) for the sake of accessibility, entertainment, and if one is honest, the chance to garner the authority of science to underwrite one’s favourite view’ (6) I can imagine Frayne taking umbrage with this as it potentially says films such as Marvel’s Into the Spiderverse (2018) for instance which also uses a backdrop of multiple universes and fluid realities for its well-worn but nevertheless entertaining narrative structure are no different to his intellectual production. (I’ve not seen the play but really love Into the Spiderverse, incidentally…)
- re the play, ‘we are left wandering aimlessly […with] only an empty feeling that quantum theory is somehow at once a manifestation of the mystery that keeps us alive and a cruel joke that deprives us of life’s meaning’ (17)
- However, Neils Bohr, in particular, has called into question ‘an entire tradition in the history of Western metaphysics: the belief that the world is populated with individual things with their own set of determinate properties. The lesson that Bohr takes from quantum physics is very deep and profound: there aren’t little things wandering aimlessly in the void that possess the complete set of properties Newtonian physics assumes’ […] “Which properties become determinate is not governed by the desires or the will of the experimenter but rather by the specificity of the experimental apparatus.”
- ‘the very nature of intentionality needs to be rethought’ (22) i.e. we can assume nothing in isolation and the network/schema/surrounding landscape in which an intention emerges is always intra-dependent. (I will get to the use of intra-rather than inter shortly)
- ‘intentions are not pre-existing determinate mental states of individual human beings’ & intentionality “might better be understood as attributable to a complex network of human and nonhuman [cameras for instance and the companies that make them] agents, including historically specific sets of material conditions that exceed the traditional notion of the individual’. (23)
- ‘an entangled state of agencies’ (23)
- She avoids analogies – especially between people and particles and I will do well to heed her warning against doing so – reductive and simplistic
- is interested in ‘conditions for the possibility of objectivity, the nature of measurement, the nature of nature and meaning making, and the relationship between discursive practices and the material world’ (24) This is where I am having some issues. First of all, because I had to get my head around ‘discursive practices’ as opposed to discursive writing – the latter is a description of a type of writing that flits from one subject to another and is a pejorative term (my writing!) The former is a complex Foucaldian term which is very difficult to comprehend… discourse-related performative actions in human behaviour in which power-relations are played out. The most useful description is as follows:
‘The discursive practice approach is grounded in four insights concerning discourse. One is the affirmation that social realities are linguistically/discursively constructed. The second is the appreciation of the context-bound nature of discourse. The third is the idea of discourse as social action. The fourth is the understanding that meaning is negotiated in interaction, rather than being present once-and-for-all in our utterances.’ From http://voidnetwork.gr/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/Discursive-practice.pdf
My problem – and this runs throughout the Barad and New Materialism material I’ve read (still reading, still trying to understand and a way to go) is that, while I appreciate that language has been given more attention than material/matter as Barad argues in debates about power – language and verbal action are in my understanding material and that distinction between the two is what prevents people up from valuing digital language (code, digital photography) which they see as non-material and therefore less worthy (in art especially). (See Lupton, 2019, How data came to matter (79)) The other thing is, assemblages and intra-actions which include discursive practices, as well as matter, don’t exist in isolation which is the base of her world view (which also tallies with systemic theories as far as I can see – again, based on very basic knowledge). I am aware I have not yet got the gist of Barad’s arguments about matter so – watch this space – I might get it eventually.
- diffractive approach – this suits my way of thinking and I wholeheartedly agree. One of the issues with photography writing in some instances is that it seems to have tunnel vision and excludes all else at times leading to phrases such as ‘photography changes everything’ which I briefly dismantled in DI&CA3. Photography then ends up being seen as a holy grail in some people’s minds when in fact it is one mechanism amongst many that contribute to meaning – and the flat, still, decisive moment kind might just be the most irrelevant and in Elkin’s terms ‘boring’ example of reality out there nowadays. (2011) Again, Lupton’s explanation of a diffractive approach, which refers to Barad, is useful. (29)
- ‘a diffractive methodology is respectful of the entanglement of ideas and other materials [ideas = materials] in ways that reflexive methodologies are not (29)
- agential realism – recognises agents both human and non-human that exists in and acknowledge the real but eschew both anti-realism/constructivism as well as realist insisters “a philosophical framework that […] entails a rethinking of fundamental concepts that support such binary thinking, including the notions of matter, discourse, causality, agency, power, identity, embodiment, objectivity, space, and time’ (26) – See page 48 for more inc. ‘representationalism is so deeply entrenched in Western culture that has taken on a common-sense appeal’ (48) What’s the alternative? Describe/how does photography reinforce this and can it help to critique it, if so how? – performative approaches
- central – ‘matter as a dynamic and shifting entanglement of relations rather than a property of things’ (35)
- Bohr: ‘we are part of that nature that we seek to understand’. ‘part of the phenomena we describe’ (26)
- NBNBNBNB ‘Performative approaches call into question the basic premises of representationalism’ (28)
‘representationalism in the belief in the ontological distinction between representation and that which they purport to represent’ (46) [I think revisit Rubenstein’s crit of Freid – Failure to Engage for more on this]
‘ther are assumed to be two distinct and independent kinds of entities – representations and entities to be represented’ (46)
‘Performative approaches call into question representationalism’s claim that there are representations, on the one hand, and ontologically separate entities awaiting representation on the other, and focus inquiry on the practices or performances of representing’ (49) Knowledge comes from ‘direct material engagement’ (49)
See page 50 for Realism without Representation – where does all this tally with Hoffman’s theory in which our only access to the world is via representation alone. His representation is wholly constructed, it does not accurately describe the real but fulfills our needs for existing within it – therefore it is our real because its the only one we have.
‘Theorists who adopt a performative approach are often quick to point out performativity is not the same as performance, and to merely talk of performance does not make an approach performative’ (60) - Intraction – 33. ‘The neologism signifies the mutual constitution of entangled agencies’ – a good deal of photography-related critical theory seems not to recognise this mutuality. ‘the primary ontological unit is not independent objects with independently determinate boundaries and properties but rather what Bohr terms phenomena. ‘The shift from the metaphysics of things to phenomena makes an enormous difference in understanding the nature of science and ontological, epistemological and ethical issues more generally’. (33)
- ‘realism is often saddled with essentialism’ (55)
- ‘theorising and experimenting are not about intervening (from outside) but about intra-acting from within, and as part of the phenomena produced’ (56)
- builds on ‘Foucault’s critique of representationalism and Bulter’s gender performativity’ – ‘gender is not an attribute of individuals’ (57) This would apply to poverty, class distinction, ‘race’, sexuality – all emerge as ‘a doing’ – performing
- ‘what is at stake in this dynamic conception of matter is an unsettling of natures presumed fixity and hence an opening up of the possibilities for change’ (64)
See Fred Ritchin’s final chapter After Photography (2010) as a possible intro into finding ways to use digital photography to bring these quantum influenced ideas into the discourse beyond scientific circles.
Think Zizek has critiqued Barad and will need to find it and see what he has to say… Been comparing what I recall of A Systemic View of Life
Azoulay, A. (2018) Ariella Azoulay – Unlearning Decisive Moments of Photography. [online blog/forum] At: http://www.fotomuseum.ch/en/explore/still-searching/authors/10605_ariella_azoulay (Accessed 15/11/2019).
Capra, F. and Luisi, P. L. (2014) The Systems View of Life: A Unifying Vision. (1 edition) Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Field, S. (2019) The Democratisation of Form, OCA Digital Image and Culture A3. [Essay]: WordPress. At: https://sjfdiculture.files.wordpress.com/2019/03/assignment-3-democratisation-of-form-submission-1.pdf (Accessed 15/11/2019).
CS & Bow Notes: More re. Performativity
One of things about studying this way (as opposed to in a classroom) is there’s plenty of freedom to go off and explore – which I do a-plenty. But because I tend to stray quite far (which is a good thing, I think, despite unavoidable pitfalls) I am prone to missing out on some basics which would make things simpler for me if I’d visited them before approaching certain topics, or at the start of doing so. I probably should have read the following and along with notes on philosopher John Austin before tackling Karen Barad’s paper. Having done a bit of digging, I get a much clearer picture about her rejection of language in favour of matter although I probably stand by my arguments for seeing language as a form of matter. I am also certain my experience of ‘actioning’ a script is going to inform my understanding and will be invaluable. I will add to this post once I’ve read Moya Lloyd’s chapter below.
To read and makes notes:
- Metaphore widely used – perform
- Derives from performance studies – dramatic terms OR sociology to perform a function in everyday life
- Connote different things – 1 to act out or 2 to achieve an acceptable level of proficiency – a 50s man reached pique performance if he went to work and provided for the wife who achieved hers if she provided supper and slippers, etc. (no matter the cost to either) – etymologically different:
“late a5c., “accomplishment” (of something), from perform + -ance. Meaning “a thing performed” is from 1590s; that of “action of performing a play, etc.” is from 1610s; that of “a public entertainment” is from 1709. Performance art is attested from 1971.” - Difference between performance – performance studies and performativity from linguistic studies – (verbal acts which have an effect on the world)
- Bulter in Gender trouble suggests both gender and sex are performative (3)
- Austin JL – originates from
- Beauvoir (Second Sex) body is not a ‘natural fact’ but an ‘historical idea’ (4)
- An identity through a ‘stylized repetition of acts’ (Beauvior, 1988-519) (5)
- Butler – Turner, life as a ritual social drama – depends on repetition of social performances – (see Chater) page 6
- repeated social performances (6)
- replication of corporeal repertoire (7)
- a gendered subject is produced (little autonomy or volition) NBNBNB
- Collective rules around acting out gender and sexuality
- Page 11/12/13 Erving Goffman – “frames”
- Sociological sorting 1977:302-3
- Doing gender is unavoidable page 14/15 west and Zimmerman 1987:137
- Differences in gender performance between Goffman and Butler page 17
- (Remember entanglement – Barrie who wants value non-linguistic elements of an assembly that results in)
- How to do things with words
- MacKinnon 1987: 171 page 18 pornography see example in S&O – nail polish NB page
Lloyd, M. (2015) ‘Performance and Performativity’ In: Ditsch, Lisa and Hawkesworth, Mary (eds.) The Oxford Handbook of Feminist Theory. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp.572–592. At: https://repository.lboro.ac.uk/articles/Performativity_and_performance/9470270 (Accessed 07/11/2019).
Research: CA A2 Daniel C Blight’s response to Charlotte Cotton’s Photography is Magic – Photography is Not Magic
I just discovered this as a draft – but never posted. The following passage is great.
“We might also beg questions of photography’s current relationship to non-representational theory here, a space in which we attempt to do away with the linguistic connotations of “reading photographs”. For as Piere Taminiaux notes in his The Paradox of Photography (2009) ‘Photography thus signifies both an end and a beginning to representation.’ Whichever theory of representation one might support, let’s remember John Harvey’s lines in his Photography and Spirit (2007), as both a criticism and a warning against such inconsistencies, which seem to forget that in the context of photography (and pertinently in the case of the algorithm), magic might not be made by the makers of photographs at all: ‘Pseudo-photographic relics and spirit photographs share not only the mystery and miracle of their manufacture but also the status of being representations of the spirit by the spirit’ [my italics].” (2015)
Update after finding post:
It seems that scientific theory is heading towards rendering representation key to our existence (Hoffman, 2019), I am not sure what to make of “Photography thus signifies both an end and a beginning to representation.’ It’s an odd sentence which I can’t make head nor tale of.
I do know Representation is under suspicion. On the one hand, science tells us we might only exist in a world of representation and reality is an illusion – on the other, science suggests phenomena rather than representation matters most. (Barad, 2003) Barad’s critique/thesis “refuses the representationalist fixation on “words” and “things” and the problematic of their relationality, advocating instead a causal relationship between specific exclusionary practices embodied as specific material configurations of the world (i.e., discursive practices/(con)figurations rather than “words”) and specific material phenomena (i.e., relations rather than “things”).”
Daniel Rubenstein argues against Michael Freid’s negation of theatre as art, quoting Lyotard. ” In Libidinal Economy Lyotard proposed that the role of the artist is to lay bare the mechanisms of theatrical [perhaps here we don’t even need the word theatrical] representation, to show that if there is anything real about representation, it is because there also exists a fully real virtual domain constructed not from objects and things, but from intensities, desires and surfaces” (2017)
As I figure out what my A3 research question is – the word representation seems to be one of the key subjects along with performativity and the collapse of fixed and certain boundaries (which representation seems so reliant on). I keep thinking about the conundrum of maths – supposedly the least emotive language that exists. Is maths a language or is it a real thing. Apparently, the clever people can’t make up their minds. But what if it’s both?
Hoffman’s book on reality paints a picture (see the video on Aeon in references) that seems to suggest that our reality is *one giant representation – a user interface, the purpose of which is to ‘hide reality’ which allows us to ‘control [our] reality’. Our objects are icons that we recognise to work out our best fitness choices – otherwise, we would be distracted by reality. Not sure yet where the maths conundrum fits here – but I do think if Hoffman’s theory has any credence then the illusion we create is the only reality we know and have, therefore it is real to us least, even though it is also representation. (“As an actor, I was not trying to fake it – I was trying to live it” – the most extreme example, the Method.)
*”When I see an apple it is a data structure – I am rendering it when I look at it. This rendering happens in everyday life (a description of fitness payoffs.)
- data structure
- rendering
- space-time itself is a data structure
- conscious agents – passing experiences back and forth
- reality is like a vast social network
- Emergence
- Entanglement
Barad, K. (2003) ‘Posthumanist Performativity: Toward an Understanding of How Matter Comes to Matter‘ In: Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society 28 (3) pp.801–831. At: https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/abs/10.1086/345321 (Accessed 30/10/2019).
Blight, D. C. (2015) Photography Is Not Magic: Photographic Images and their Digital Spirit. (AXA Online] At: https://americansuburbx.com/2015/10/photography-is-not-magic-photographic-images-and-their-digital-spirit.html (Accessed 06/11/2019).
Aeon (2019) It’s impossible to see the world as it is, argues a cognitive neuroscientist | Aeon Videos At: https://aeon.co/videos/its-impossible-to-see-the-world-as-it-is-argues-a-cognitive-neuroscientist (Accessed 06/11/2019).
Rubinstein, D. (2017) ‘Failure to Engage: Art Criticism in the Age of Simulacrum‘ In: Journal of Visual Culture 16 (1) pp.43–55. At: http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/1470412917690970 (Accessed 06/11/2019).
CS & BOW: Reflection
Where I’m at right now….
- I have a meeting with Matt White on Monday and waiting to hear from Ruth te A2.
- I feel the Pic London project introduced me to useful ideas, concepts, and practices that were good to come into contact with. The actual work produced feels more exploratory and research-led than anything – however, the image of the inside of the cave which has been in my work previously seems to have played a significant role. I am not sure how I take some of my frustrations forward re. the group’s inability to make the improvisations function. I have thought about attempting it with other people. I could suggest trying it with the Pic London group but I am not sure they are up for it. It’s very difficult to read what’s going on there – perhaps because we were only ever able to talk online, I cannot work it out. One of the things I noticed in the Ballpark Collective’s statement is how very clear the rules were and how they didn’t speak about the work outside of the game:
- “The parameters of this involve creating a moving image from 5 individual works, each made by one of the artists. Through the random act of ‘pulling sticks,’ the collective decided on a chronological order to respond and react. The artist who pulled the shortest straw started the process by creating a moving image piece based on their response to the theme Interdependence. The work was presented to the next artist, who then responded with a work informed by their interpretation, or reaction to it. There was no discussion between the artists outside the ritual of passing the work to the next, allowing the process to highlight individual perspectives and the gaps in communication. When the process was complete, each of the works was edited together to create a whole.” (2019)
- The cave is something I looked at as far back at TAOP (before I’d looked at Plato’s Cave in UVC) See – https://www.sarahjanefield.co.uk/Colour-Assignment-Slideshow/n-GMdPr/
- These images seemed to be expressing a sense of existing in what I referred to as my ‘grief cave’. I think I even wrote a short thing about it – falling into the cave and bumping into a projection down there, an imp who played tricks and wasn’t real but was.

- I need to revisit some work I began last year which I called “Manipulated: My Leica and I, Leica Amateurs show their Pictures (1937) rephotographed, edited, uploaded; phone & proprietary apps only (c)SJField2018. Some examples from the page at the end of this blog. However, I am not sure about continuing with the Leica book for BOW but I may transfer the basic premise to another or film or text of some description. https://www.instagram.com/fieldsarahjane Also, the experiments there are too static, not dynamic enough. (Not that all need to be the same – variety of unstable imagery was what I was going for – also the base image needs to move and come out of its place.)
- There is so much that makes me cringe in this S&O A3 project but it was a turning point while studying with the OCA for me and is definitely worth revisiting. https://ocasjf.wordpress.com/2018/01/09/draft-assignment-3-filters-voice-and-speech-lessons-for-the-theatre/
- Returning to the TAOP A3 (colour) assignment briefly – As far back as then I was focused on the use of the word theatre which has so often been associated with photography – I included the following slide at the start of the assignment:

- It’s been fascinating reading through Fried and then various responses to his thoughts on theatricality and anti-theatricality, and then seeing the use of the words performativity used by Barad. I’ve noticed several related words on the Contents page of Feminist Futures of Spatial Practice: Materialisms, Activisms, Dialogues, Pedagogies, Projections 2017 [PDF] – such as dance, masked, imaginary, rehearsal, acting out, play. I think Fried’s negation of theatre is a complete misnomer and that theatre and theatricality are at the core of what it is to be.
- I really had no idea that I would find myself revisiting the first dissertation (1994). This has all come about after asking other students for an alternative view to James Elkins’ statement that photography might actually be rather dull. Freid was recommended and now here I am – See previous blogs on Barad – performativity, and Rubenstein on theatricality and Fried. I have no copy of my first dissertation and no way of finding one. I could barely write at the time but I suspect it dragged my overall grade up from a 2.2 to a 2.1. I looked at the ritualistic origins of theatre. I explored ‘commune’. One of the things I noticed in the Rubenstein response to Freid was how everyone sees theatre as intrinsically about representation, a separateness between viewer and action, othering – but it strikes me that the origins of theatre are about oneness – an attempt to re-engage with the universe rather than draw away from it. It’s an early church.
- I wrote about trying to create a universe in my BOW A2. Theatre is a reality laboratory. It’s not about trying to create a fake. Well, at least, once Stanislavski got hold of it, it no longer was. And then there’s the Method. Maybe Stansilavski was simply taking theatre back to its origins. Isn’t it funny that the fakeness of a diorama is where photography purportedly began (putting aside Azoulay’s ant-Cartesian reading of the origins of photography). I feel I do need to revisit these ideas – although I am not sure how just yet.
Below – a couple of the Manipulated (2018) posts. Visit for more.
CS & Bow: Research notes, Daniel Rubinstein, Failure to Engage 2017
www.danielrubinstein.net/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/Failure-to-Engage.pdf
This article by Daniel Rubinstein confirms my recognition of Freid’s conservativism and does a super job of helping me to more fully comprehend some of the ideas in Barad’s essay. Beneath the argument about theatricality and anti-theatricality, it explores the changing nature of being and knowledge – or ontology and epistemology, as expressed via quantum sciences and philosophies, namely Barad (2003), Lupton (2019), Rovelli (2017), Capra (2014) – leading to what Barad terms “Onto-epistem-ology”[which is] —the study of practices of knowing in being—is probably a better way to think about the kind of understandings that are needed to come to terms with how specific intra-actions matter.” (2003: 829) (See Rovelli and Kant in the previous blog.)
However, Barad argues against what she calls representationalism, which is; “the belief in the ontological distinction between representations and that which they purport to represent; in particular, that which is represented is held to be independent of all practices of representing. That is, there are assumed to be two distinct and independent kinds of entities—representations and entities to be represented” (804) If you can overcome this and see “representationalism as a Cartesian by-product—a particularly inconspicuous consequence of the Cartesian division between “internal” and “external” that breaks along the line of the knowing subject.” (Rouse, 1996: 209, Barad, 2003:805) then the arguments made be Fried begin to disintegrate. As – “it is possible to develop coherent philosophical positions that deny that there are representations on the one hand and ontologically separate entities awaiting representation on the other” (807) relying instead on emergence. And ff you see theatre as a laboratory (not just Growtowski’s but the entire history of it) then perhaps Fried’s entire argument collapses – although I am not sure Rubinstein gets there with this.
Some quotes below and perhaps an occasional note:
- by way of identifying the dualist oppositions and the ideological investments that establish the ontological significance of this text. (44)
- Fried is not criticising the work of certain artists, but devising a universal method for distinguishing true art from ‘objecthood’, based on the assumption that (Fried’s) consciousness can distinguish physical reality from art (44) (religiosity)
- this rejection leads him to adopt a conception of art that is hierarchical, analytical and traditionalist (45)
- contemporary philosophical thought that studies theatricality as part of the logocentric apparatus inherited from the Renaissance (45)
- The conception of ‘objecthood’ in contemporary art can be traced to Duchamp’s readymades which he created by selecting, modifying and rectifying mass-produced objects (46)
- this opposition between the image and the real has its roots in Platonism, where the sensible world is produced as a copy of the world of ideas, and it is the task of reason to overcome the errors of the copy in order to arrive at the truth (46) Far more simply explained here than in Barad’s essay
- The touchstone for this distinction is whether the image declares itself to be an image (the fable of the cave is told as a fable) or whether the image pretends not to be one, disguising itself as an object (47)
- Plato’s demand for ‘primary distinction’ between images and models is motivated by the moral need to protect the idea of truth from the dangerous world of simulacra. (47) In CS A2, I argue the shadows on the wall of the attic are the actual real – what looks like the simulacra is just as real as the flesh and blood version watching the slides – although more likely they exist together, both real, both valuable (see Jung – dream world equal to waking world)
- The artworks that Fried designates as ‘theatrical’ seem to have a common denominator: they strive to take over the real, to immerse and to overwhelm us by replacing the real with a readymade and truth with simulacrum until we are no longer able to distinguish the artwork from the real, the referent from the sign, and the subject from the object. (48)
- Critical opposition to theatricality will not get one very far, as opposition itself is a theatrical requisite (49)
- Quote Fried, “The Platonic division of the cave, which is effectively the theatrical division between a real outside and an inside simulating this outside … The thing stands for something else, and it is less than what it represents. In order that it be what it is, there has been a lack of being. What is given to us, insofar as it is not similitude itself, is deficient in force. The theatricality of representation implies this deficiency, this depression. (pp. 68, 71, emphases in original)” (49) See Barad and her refusal of representation being something that acts as a sign for something previous and original. (50)
- Here the antinomy to the ‘theatrical cube’ is being revealed not as anti- theatricality, but as an infinite movement of surfaces that continuously self- replicate and morph into each other (50)
- If the origin of theatre is in negation, and if its operation is representational, then the deeper reason Fried can speak of a ‘war’ between theatricality and real art becomes clear. (51)
- Anti-theatricality, in other words, implies that in order to be meaningful, accessible and ‘true’, the artwork has to inhabit some form of transcendental negation, or excluded middle or some other form of metaphysical ground (51)
- by arguing against the dualism of theatricality and for the monism of ‘real’ art, he is unable to move beyond the very dualism he is trying to unsettle as his thought is chained to the common-sense notion that representation is a natural, ordinary, everyday occurrence (52)
- The deeper structure of Fried’s argument is that true knowledge can transcend mere appearances and grasp their underlying presence. As Luce Irigaray (1985[1974]) has shown, this framework is based on the notion of a stable subject that comprehends – like Rodin’s Thinker – a world that is also stable and unchanging. (53)
- Freid’s description of Caro’s sculptures are ‘performative’ therefore theatrical (53) They are also elitist and come about due to a his privileged and educated position.
- according to Fried, the greatest danger: under the auspice of theatre, art loses its spiritual, sensual and theological dimension. When art is stripped of its mystical, spiritual powers, of its direct link with experience through the unmediated connection with life, all that remains is the theatre: a pale re-enactment of the mysteries of the sacrificial ritual. (53) This is a bizarre argument given theatre’s roots are deeply embedded in the spiritual and mystical, and was born out of attempts to commune with the gods (the universe).
- Putting the object first will not work because the opposition between art and non-art is itself the product of an ideology that asserts that there is a real world that can be taken up and represented as an image (53) which Barad argues against using quantum knowledge.
Edited 01/09/2009 to correct the spelling of Rubinstein’s name